Abstract-We introduce a method for strategy acquisition in nonzero-sum n-player games and empirically validate it by applying it to a well-known benchmark problem in this domain, namely, the double-auction market. Many existing approaches to strategy acquisition focus on attempting to find strategies that are robust in the sense that they are good all-round performers against all-comers. We argue that, in many economic and multiagent scenarios, the robustness criterion is inappropriate; in contrast, our method focuses on searching for strategies that are likely to be adopted by participating agents, which is formalized as the size of a strategy's basins of attraction under the replicator dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E introduce a heuristic method for searching for strategies in multiagent interactions such as auction marketplaces. Many existing heuristic methods for strategy acquisition, such as coevolutionary search, attempt to search for strategies that yield a high payoff, irrespective of the opponents' behavior [1] . In contrast, our method searches for strategies that are likely to be adopted by a population of agents using social learning [2, p. 67] . We shall argue that the latter criterion is particularly useful in the context of a mechanism design [3] problem. In a mechanism design problem, the task of the designer is to choose the rules of a game, such as an auction, in such a way that the designer's objectives are met when agents play their equilibrium strategies.
The traditional approach to mechanism design involves evaluating outcomes under conditions of Nash equilibria [4] . There are two main difficulties with this approach. First, the traditional game-theoretic approach assumes that the space of strategies for each agent is common knowledge. However, in many realistic multiagent interactions, the space of possible policies for each agent is not known a priori, making the computation of the Nash equilibria intractable in the general case. Second, for arbitrary mechanisms, we may observe multiple equilibria for a given game, and it may not be clear which of these multiple potential outcomes are likely to be adopted in the long run. This paper focuses on a specific problem domain-the double auction. The double auction has come to be recognized as an important benchmark problem, in both economics and multiagent systems. In particular, a landmark workshop [5] held in Santa Fe, NM, motivated much contemporary research in this area by highlighting the difficulty of agents' decision problems in nonidealized variants of this type of marketplace.
The outline of this paper is given as follows. In Section II, we describe the double-auction game. In Section III, we detail the methodology that we use to heuristically analyze this game. In Section IV, we formalize the space of possible strategies for the double auction. In Section V, we formalize the objective function that we use to search for new strategies. In Section VI, we describe the search space of strategies. In Section VII, we describe our search algorithm. In Section VIII, we report the results of an empirical validation of our algorithm. In Section IX, we discuss potential applications of our algorithm, and we conclude in Section X.
II. DOUBLE-AUCTION MARKET
A double auction is a generalization of the more commonly known single-sided auctions, in which a single seller sells goods to multiple competing buyers (or the reverse). In a double auction, as well as multiple buyers competing against each other resulting in price rises, multiple sellers of the same commodity compete against each other resulting in price falls. Institutions of this type are also known as exchanges.
Our model of the double auction is adapted from [6] - [9] and is an attempt to describe these different market scenarios within a unified model. In this model, time is represented in discrete slices t ∈ N. We will follow the convention of representing the value of any time-dependent variable X at time t by subscripting with t : X t .
The marketplace is populated by a finite number of traders, which are represented by the set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n }. A single commodity is traded in the marketplace. The commodity is traded in discrete indivisible units.
Traders are divided into two mutually exclusive sets: buyers, which are represented by the set B ⊂ A, and sellers, which are represented by the set S ⊂ A. We assume that agents are risk neutral (utility linearly increases with increased wealth). Buyers purchase resources for consumption, and sellers produce products for sale. Each agent a i has a private valuation v i ∈ R that determines the utility of a transaction in the marketplace. If a single unit is transacted at price p, then buyers obtain utility v i − p, whereas sellers obtain p − v i .
Trade is conducted through a bidding process in which agents submit limit orders for a specified price, quantity, and direction (buy or sell). Limit orders are analogous to bids in a single-sided auction; they specify the maximum (minimum) price at which an agent is willing to buy (sell). The double auction uses a limit-order book to match orders from opposing directions, producing a set of transactions that determine the price, quantity, and counterparties of any given trade in the market. The process of producing transactions from orders is called clearing. There are many variants of the double-auction market; in this paper, we analyze a clearing-house mechanism with uniform pricing, which means that: 1) orders from all participants are queued up prior to the clearing operation and 2) all trades take place at the same price (the midpoint of the market quote, as advertised prior to clearing).
III. METHODOLOGY
Since a traditional game-theoretic analysis of the double auction is intractable [10] , we analyze the double-auction market game using the heuristic methodology described in [10] and [11] . The central idea is to restrict attention to a small representative sample of "heuristic" strategies that are known to be commonly played in a given multistate game. For many complex n-player games that are representative of real-world economic interactions, such as the double auction, unsurprisingly, none of the strategies commonly in use can be proven to be dominant over the others. Given the absence of a dominant strategy, it is then natural to ask if there are mixtures of these "pure" strategies that constitute game-theoretic equilibria.
For small numbers of players and heuristic strategies, we can construct a relatively small normal-form payoff matrix that is amenable to game-theoretic analysis. This heuristic payoff matrix is calibrated by running many iterations of the game; variations in payoffs due to different player types (e.g., private valuations) or stochastic environmental factors (e.g., pseudorandom number generator seed) are averaged over many samples of type information, resulting in a single mean payoff to each player for each cell in the payoff matrix. The players' types are assumed to be independently drawn from the same distribution, and an agent's choice of strategy is assumed to be independent of its type, which allows the payoff matrix to be further compressed, since we simply need to specify the number of agents playing each strategy to determine the expected payoff to each agent. Thus, for a game with j strategies, we represent entries in the heuristic payoff matrix as vectors of the form
where p i specifies the number of agents who are playing the ith strategy. Each entry p ∈ P is mapped onto an outcome vector q ∈ Q of the form
where q i specifies the expected payoff to the ith strategy. For a game with n agents, the number of entries in the payoff matrix is given by
For a small n and a small j, this results in payoff matrices of manageable size; for j = 3 and n = 6, 8, and 10, we have s = 28, 45, and 66, respectively. Although this technique is only tractable for small numbers of simultaneous players n, these are precisely the scenarios that are typically more difficult to analyze. Interactions among small numbers of agents afford more opportunity for individual agents to have a large effect on the final outcome, whereas systems with large numbers of interacting agents can more readily be modeled as a collection of homogeneous particle-like entities. The constraint on a small j is more limiting; we shall return to this issue in Section VIII-A.
Once the payoff matrix has been computed, we can subject it to a rigorous game-theoretic analysis, search for Nash equilibrium solutions, and apply different models of learning and evolution, such as the replicator dynamics model, to analyze the dynamics of adjustment to equilibrium. We use the framework described above to search for a novel strategy for a specific trading game, namely, the double auction. In the next section, we describe the space of heuristic strategies used in our analysis.
IV. HEURISTIC STRATEGIES
Each agent a i has an associated trading strategy ζ i , which specifies a mapping between its valuation v i and the order that it will place at time t. For simplicity, we shall assume that buyers always submit orders to buy (bids), sellers always submit orders to sell (asks), and each agent only submits orders for a single unit; thus, ζ merely specifies the price of the order according to the strategy being deployed.
We use three representative classes of strategy, i.e., truth telling (TT), reinforcement learning (RL), and GjerstadDickhaut (GD), which are described in detail below. The TT strategy was chosen since it is the simplest strategy that is able to achieve high-efficiency outcomes in a homogeneous population in the clearing-house mechanism. The GD strategy was chosen as a representative of the class of highly principled and highly engineered strategies that analyze historical market data. Finally, we included RL strategies since they are commonly used to model human game-playing behavior in experimental economics [12] .
A. TT Strategy
The TT strategy simply places orders equal to the agent's valuation:
Although it is extremely simple, the TT strategy is of fundamental importance, since in an incentive-compatible mechanism by definition, this strategy is guaranteed to obtain the optimal payoff for agent a i no matter what strategies are adopted by the other agents [13] .
B. GD Strategy
The GD [14] strategy uses historical data to estimate the probability of an order being accepted as a function of its price and then accordingly chooses the price that maximizes expected utility. This strategy is described in detail in [14] .
C. RL Strategies
RL strategies rely only on the immediate feedback from interacting with the mechanism, i.e., the surplus that each agent was able to obtain in the most recent round of trading.
These strategies choose their markup over their valuation price; thus
based on a reward signal RL ρ i (t), which represents the utility of the most recent trade of agent a i .
The function RL λ i : N → Θ i represents the output of learning algorithm λ, where Θ i = [0, RL k i ) ⊂ N is the set of possible outputs from λ.
1) DR Learning Algorithm:
The dumb random (DR) learning algorithm is a control algorithm that, in fact, performs no learning and randomly chooses actions: RL λ i = δ i t , where δ i t is a discrete random variable uniformly distributed in the range [0, RL k i ). This algorithm can be used in control experiments by substituting it for one of the other algorithms below; if an observation is preserved under this substitution, we can conclude that our observation is not likely to be due to the learning behavior.
2) RE Learning Algorithm: The Roth-Erev (RE) algorithm is designed to mimic human game-playing behavior in extensive-form games [12] . Agents probabilistically bid according to RL λ i (t) = RE i (t) = δ i t , where δ i t ∈ Θ i is a discrete random variable distributed as follows:
The propensities are initialized based on the scaling parameter
the RE q are then updated based on the experience function RE
where the experience function depends on the most recent reward signal RL ρ and the last action chosen by the agent RE i (t − 1)
and then normalized to produce a vector of probabilities; let Q i t denote the sum of all the propensities for agent i , a i , t) .
3) Nicolaisen et al.'s Modified RE Algorithm:
Nicolaisen et al. [8] used a modified version of the RE algorithm (denoted as NPT) for their trading strategy, which they used to explore the market power effects in a simulated electricity market
where RE i (t) is computed identically to RE i (t), except for a modification to the experience function
4) SQ Algorithm:
The stateless Q-learning (SQ) algorithm is a single-state version of a temporal-difference RL algorithm called Q-Learning [15] . The algorithm maintains a table SQ Q (θ, a i , t), which can be thought of as an estimate of the payoff to each possible action θ ∈ Θ i . The estimates are updated using the rule
where SQ γ i ∈ R is a discount factor, and SQ α i is a parameter controlling the rate of convergence. Actions are chosen to maximize the estimated payoff using an -greedy rule
where it ∈ R is a random variable uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], and δ it ∈ N is a discrete random variable uniformly distributed in the interval [0,
V. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
In a conventional game-theoretic analysis, we solve the game by finding either a dominant strategy or the Nash equilibria: the sets of strategies that are best responses to each other. However, because classical game theory is a static analysis, it is not able to make any predictions about which equilibria are more likely to occur in practice. Such considerations are of vital importance in analyzing real-world problems. For example, if we are interested in using game theory to analyze economic outcomes, we should give more consideration to outcomes that are more likely than to low-probability outcomes; if there is a Nash equilibrium for our mechanism that yields very low allocative efficiency, we should not worry too much if this equilibrium is extremely unlikely to occur in practice. On the other hand, we should give more weight to equilibria with a high probability.
As in [10] , we use evolutionary game theory to model how agents might gradually adjust their strategies over time as they learn to improve their behavior in response to their payoffs. Thus, we use the replicator dynamics equation [16] 
where m is a mixed-strategy vector, u( m, m) is the mean payoff when all players play m, u(e j , m) is the average payoff to pure strategy j when all players play m, andṁ j is the first derivative of m j with respect to time. Strategies that gain above-average payoff become more likely to be played, and this equation models a simple coevolutionary process of mimicry learning, in which agents switch to strategies that appear to be more successful [2, p. 67].
Those Nash equilibria that are stationary points at which a larger range of initial states will end up are equilibria that are more likely to be reached (assuming an initial distribution of m j that is uniform); in the terminology of dynamic systems, they have a larger basin of attraction. The basin of attraction for a stationary point is the proportion of mixed strategies in that have flows terminating at that point. This intuitive definition of the basin size is formalized as follows. Let the function
T :
n × 2 n → N represent the trajectories that terminate at each coordinate in the n-dimensional unit-simplex n ⊂ R n , so that we have
where M is a set of starting points, and x is a limit state. Let β( x, M ) denote the proportion of the elements of M that terminate at x
If we choose a random sample M ⊂ that is uniformly distributed over the simplex, the function β will provide us with an estimate of the probability of arriving at any given stationary point, assuming that all starting points in the simplex are equally likely; that is, it will provide an estimate of the true basin size of the limit state x, which is denoted by β( x), and
Our method searches for strategies that are likely to be adopted under the replicator dynamics. More formally, we use an objective function that estimates the expected frequency with which our candidate strategy will be played in equilibrium outcomes. Thus, our objective function is
where i is the index of the candidate heuristic strategy being evaluated from among the set of heuristic strategies S with 
VI. SEARCH SPACE
We use the objective function described in the previous section to search for strategies that are able to achieve high adoption rates under the replicator dynamics model of social learning. We start with a population of agents able to use three different heuristic strategies: TT, GD, and RE, which is an RL strategy that uses the RE algorithm (Section IV-C2) calibrated with parameters that best fit the data from human experiments [17] : ∀i
Our goal is to search a space of strategies to acquire a new strategy that is likely to be adopted by this existing population. In a previous work [18] , a sensitivity analysis demonstrated that small perturbations in payoff estimates in favor of the RE strategy yielded substantial improvements in basin size for this strategy. This suggested generalizations of the RE strategy as possible candidates for further optimization. RE belongs to the class of RL strategies, which we use as our search space. Thus, in our experiment, we have S = {s * , TT, GD, RE}; s * is a strategy represented as a 50-bit string, where 1) bits 1-8 code for parameter RL μ in the range (1, 10); 2) bits 9-16 code for the parameters SQ or RE η in the range (0, 1); 3) bits 17-24 code for parameter RL k in the range (2, 258); 4) bits 25-32 code for parameters SQ γ or RE ρ in the range (0, 1); 5) bits 33-40 code for parameter RE s in the range (1, 15 000); 6) bits 41-42 code for the choice of learning algorithm among RE, NPT, SQ, or DR; 7) bits 43-50 code for parameter SQ α in the range (0, 1).
VII. SEARCH ALGORITHM
A genetic algorithm (GA) was used to search this space of strategies, where the fitness of each individual strategy in the search space was computed by estimating its basin size under the replicator dynamics under interaction with our existing three strategies: GD, TT, and RE. Since we recompute all entries in the heuristic payoff matrix in support of each candidate strategy, we use lower sample sizes to facilitate the evaluation of many strategies. The sample size for the number of games played for each entry in the heuristic payoff matrix was increased as a function of the generation number, i.e., 10 + int(100 ln(g + 1)), allowing the search algorithm to quickly find high-fitness regions of the search space in earlier generations and reducing noise due to sampling error, thus allowing more refinement of solutions in later generations. We used a constant number of replicator dynamics trajectories |M | = 50 to estimate the basin size from the payoff matrix once it had been recomputed for our candidate strategy. The entire search process is summarized in pseudocode in Algorithm 1 Fig. 1 . Mean fitness of the GA population with one standard deviation. (Fig. 3) ; we call this the FiSH algorithm, since we will use it to "fish" for a new heuristic strategy.
A GA was principally chosen because of its ability to cope with the additional noise that the lower sample size introduced into the objective function. The GA was configured with a population size of 100, with single-point crossover, a crossover rate of 1, a mutation rate of 10 −4 , and fitness-proportionate selection. The GA was ran for 32 generations, which took approximately 1800 CPU hours on a dual-processor Xeon 3.6-GHz workstation.
As in [10] , at the start of each game, half of the agents are randomly assigned to be buyers, and the remainder are assigned to be as sellers. For each run of the game, valuations are drawn as in [10] 
but valuations remain fixed across periods to allow agents to attempt to learn to exploit any market-power advantage in the supply and demand curves defined by the limit prices for that game. The 64-bit version of the Mersenne Twister random number generator [19] was used to draw all random values used in the simulation. Each entry in the heuristic payoff matrix was computed by averaging the payoff to each strategy across 10 4 simulations.
VIII. RESULTS Fig. 1 shows the mean fitness of the GA population for each generation. As can be seen, the variation in fitness values in later generations is still large. However, the inspection of a random sample of strategies from each generation revealed a partial convergence in phenotype but with significant fluctuations in fitness values due to small sample sizes (see above). Most notably, the fittest individual at generation 32 had also intermittently appeared as the fittest individual five times in the previous ten generations, and thus, this was taken as the output from the search. We proceeded to analyze our specimen strategy under a full heuristic strategy analysis using 10 4 samples of the game for each of the 455 entries in the payoff matrix. This favorably compares with a market share of 32% for TT and 3% for GD. The original RE strategy is dominated by our OS.
A. Iterative Approach
This method can be generalized to an arbitrary set of initial heuristic strategies, as shown in the FiSH algorithm (Fig. 3) .
We have empirically validated FiSH by applying it to a highly complex game, i.e., the double auction, and demonstrated that it is capable of finding a new strategy with interesting properties, as demonstrated in the previous section. However, one might ask whether our new OS or, more accurately, our new set of equilibria over OS ∪ S is not susceptible to the same process of systematically searching for an invader. Of course, the answer is that this is indeed a possibility. We could straightforwardly test for this by applying exactly the same analysis to our new set of equilibria; that is, we could perform another sensitivity analysis to see whether our new equilibria are stable under payoff perturbations. If they were, then we might conclude that our equilibria are comparatively stable for the time being. If they are not stable, however, we could then perform another systematic search for variations in the current strategies that are good candidates for potential invaders of the status quo, that is, new strategies that form equilibria with a large estimated basin size in interaction with the incumbents. By repeatedly performing this process, we will eventually end up with a refined set of equilibrium strategies. The pseudocode for this process is shown in Algorithm 2 (Fig. 4) , which is called the FiSH+ algorithm.
IX. APPLICATIONS
Many algorithms for strategy acquisition focus on searching for strategies that are generally robust when played against existing strategies. However, it is extremely difficult to formulate objective metrics for ranking the robustness of strategies in the nonzero-sum n-player games, which typify interactions in marketplaces and multiagent systems. In contrast, our method for strategy acquisition focuses on searching for strategies that are likely to be adopted by the participants. This has several applications in both economics and computer science, which we discuss below.
First, the level of adoption of a particular strategy may be a real-world design consideration in and of itself. For example, the inventor of a trading strategy such as zero-intelligence plus (ZIP) [6] may have intellectual property rights that generate revenue in proportion to its level of adoption. In a wider context, many other software artifacts exist in a competitive ecology [20] .
Second, the primary economic application of our method is to the mechanism design problem [3] , [21] . In a mechanism design problem, one attempts to define market "mechanisms," that is, the rules of the market, in such a way that design objectives such as maximizing the market efficiency EA are achieved when agents follow their utility-maximizing strategies. The revelation principle [3, p. 82 ] states that we can restrict this search problem to mechanisms in which agents directly reveal their valuations to the auctioneer; it then suffices to demonstrate that the TT strategy (Section IV-A) is a dominant strategy under our candidate mechanism (this property is called incentive compatibility) and that efficiency or other design objectives are maximized when all agents adopt TT. However, real-world considerations mean that it is rarely possible to design incentivecompatible mechanisms in which a simple strategy such as TT is unequivocally dominant (and hence likely to be adopted), particularly in the case of double-sided mechanisms or when we have legacy constraints in the design [22] . In such scenarios, it may be more practical to demonstrate that design objectives such as high efficiency are satisfied when agents use an existing nontruthful strategy such as ZIP [6] or GD, provided that this strategy is likely to be adopted. However, in many cases, it will be difficult to demonstrate that a single existing strategy has a high probability of adoption. The FiSH algorithm can be used in precisely such a situation to search for highly adoptable strategies.
Finally, there is a sense in which our algorithm may be useful for searching for robust strategies in nonzero-sum n-player games. In two-player zero-sum games, the Nash solution is guaranteed to yield the security level of the game and is thus demonstrably robust; however, this result does not generalize to n-player nonzero-sum games. In such games, the best we can do is play a best response to the strategies adopted by other agents; however, in the general case (i.e., with multiple equilibria), there is no unequivocal method that will tell us which strategies will be selected by our opponents. The FiSH algorithm escapes from this logic by searching for hitherto unconsidered strategies that are likely to be adopted by agents who learn. Thus, if we modify (2) to incorporate payoff maximization in addition to basin size
we can then use the algorithm to find strategies that are simultaneously payoff maximizing and are also likely to be adopted by one's opponents (provided that they choose from the available strategies using a learning process similar to that modeled by the replicator dynamics). In future work, we will explore this application of our algorithm to more general games.
X. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a novel method (Algorithm 1 in Fig. 3 ) for the acquisition of strategies in nonzero-sum n-player games. Many existing approaches to strategy acquisition focus on attempting to find strategies that are robust in the sense that they are good all-round performers against any other strategy. We have argued that, in many economic and multiagent scenarios, the robustness criterion is inappropriate and impossible to assess. Instead, our method focuses on searching for strategies that are likely to be adopted: we have formalized a metric [see (2) ] for estimating the likelihood of adoption under a social learning process modeled by the replicator dynamics, which is based on an estimate of the basin size [see (1)], and described how this can be calculated using numerical methods. We have empirically validated our method by applying it to a benchmark problem (Sections VII and VIII).
Our method makes use of an evolutionary computing (EC) algorithm to perform heuristic optimization. However, it differs from existing EC methods for strategy acquisition, such as coevolutionary search, in that we perform a full game-theoretic analysis over a small working set of heuristic strategies (Section III), rather than a small sample of fitness comparisons over the full space of strategies.
